This paper experimentally investigates the nature of impulses in impulse learning. Particularly, we analyze whether positive feedback (i.e., yielding a superior payo in a game) or negative feedback (i.e., yielding an inferior payo in a game) leads to a systematic change in the individual choices. The results reveal that subjects predominantly learn from negative feedback.
Introduction
One of the big issues in behavioral economics is learning. The question of whether and (if so) how people's decisions converge towards an equilibrium by repeatedly playing is subject of a large number of studies (cf. the recent survey by Erev & Haruvy, 2012) . One central approach is impulse learning. Although impulse learning models follow quite dierent ideas on how to model the attraction of a pure strategy in period t based on the experience of t − 1 past periods, they share an important feature: receiving feedback about the (potentially) earned payo by choosing strategy k in the period t − 1 (the impulse) inuences the condence with which k is chosen in the current 2 Both cases coincide for games with two pure actions for each player: the negative stimulus for one pure action equals the equivalent positive stimulus for the alternative action. However, considering a game with three pure actions allows us to disentangle the two potential sources for the impulse.
In contrast to previous studies (e.g., Grosskopf, 2003 , and Chmura et al., 2012), we try to measure single impulses for feedback as narrowly as possible.
For this purpose, we will eliminate any eect of aggregation over several periods of play, but observe the impulse in a game that is played twice only.
As a consequence, our results are neither based on mean impulses resulting from a number of t interactions nor based on a single impulse, which, however, reects the fact that a number of t − 2 interactions are still to come. 2 We will clarify the terms superior and inferior payos below.
The Game
We consider the following simultaneous-move game for two players. One of them, A, has three alternative actions {Up, Left, Right}; the other, B, is endowed with 100 points. B has to allocate the points on three options, {x, y, 100 − x − y}. Denoting A's choice as δ A , payo functions π A and π B for A and B, respectively, are
and
Another interpretation of the game is the following: both players face 100 identical games. A has to decide uniformly for all 100 games, while B
can choose independently for each of the 100 games where to allocate one point. Obviously, Left is dominated for A, whereas x = 100 maximizes the minimum payo for B. The game has three Nash equilibria, {Up, y = 100}, {Right, x = y = 0}, and a mixed one where A mixes Up with probability 3/5 and Right with probability 2/5, and B mixes x = 0, y = 100 with probability 1/3 and x = y = 0 with probability 2/3.
As mentioned earlier, central elements of impulse learning models are the condence with which a player chooses a pure strategy k and the impulse caused by the feedback players receive on their previous choice of k. Typically, impulse learning models interpret the condence for k as the density of k (i.e., k's attraction) to be chosen in the consecutive period. For our analysis, we will oer a dierent reading of condence: we assume that B's increasing condence for k corresponds with an increasing number of points B assigns for k. That is, players assign points in accordance to their condence. Similar behavior is documented elsewhere and referred to as probability matching (e.g., Vulkan, 2000). In turn, changes in the points assigned on k show us the eect of feedback on the condence for k in other words, the impulse.
Experimental Procedure and Expectations
The game is repeated twice with constant roles, but changing partners. We have two treatment conditions in the experiment: a game with no feedback The experiments were run in the WisoLab at the University of Hamburg in mid 2011. In the experiment, we use a graphical representation of (1) and (2) Before focusing on player B's learning, we have to distinguish in a rst step between good news and bad news for B's strategy. Therefore, we have to dene a reference value that divides the return rates per point into superior and inferior outcomes. Following Selten and Chmura (2008), we use the maximum of B's minimum values (maximin value) for this purpose. That is, we choose the return rate B receives for sure as the reference value. In our game, any point distributed on x yields at least one point (i.e., ∂π B ∂x ≥ 1), while the other two alternatives may lead to lower returns. Therefore, B's maximin value is one, while return rates smaller (greater) than one are denoted as inferior (superior). Consequently, good news for x are δ A = Left, for y δ A = Up, while bad news for y are δ A = Right. 4 The number of points assigned to 100 − x − y is special in the sense that it is by itself a residual rather than a clear-cut option. Therefore, subjects may not learn with respect to this alternative as they learn predominantly on x and y. Nonetheless, one can consider good news (bad news) for 100 − x − y as δ A = Right (δ A = Up and δ A = Left). We will acknowledge the special character of this alternative in the consecutive analysis.
4
of points assigned on y in the second period. Notice that no impulse model provides specic predictions concerning the alternative which loses points (to counterbalance a positive impulse), or gains points (to counterbalance a negative impulse).
Results
Let us rst consider B's decisions in the rst game. On average, B invests approximately 50 points altogether on x and y, both in NF and PF. Mean x is 31.1 (25.9) and mean y is 26.7 in NF (30.3 in PF); the dierences between NF and PF are not signicant (Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum-Test, two-tailed, p = 0.33 for x, and p = 0.59 for y). Moreover, x and y are signicantly positive correlated both in NF and PF.
5 Thus it seems that Bs divide points roughly equally between x and y. Since B's decisions on x and y are interdependent, we analyze the changes of points on x and y between the rst and second period by means of a simultaneous equation estimation. The dependent variables x and y in the second period, denoted as x 2 and y 2 , are regressed on x 1 and y 1 , respectively (i.e., x and y in the rst period), in order to test for the path dependency of learning. 6 In addition, we test the impulse of feedback on x 2 and y 2 : For this purpose, let us dene the dummy variables f u , f l and f r which are one if B receives in PF the feedback that δ A = Up, δ A = Left, and δ A = Right the rst period, respectively, and zero otherwise. Regression results are shown in Table 1 . 6 One could claim that we do not observe some kind of learning, but simply hedging between risky actions. In this case, we should observe signicantly negative coecients x 1 and y 1 .
7 Standard errors in parentheses; asterisks indicate levels of signicance: * signicant at a 10% level, * * signicant at a 5% level, and * * * signicant at a 1% level; number of 5 8 Finally, there is at least weak evidence (i.e., the weakly signicant coecient of f r in the equation on x 2 ) that the alternative x, ensuring at least the reference value, counterbalances the negative impulse on y. This is remarkable since increasing x in not a (myopic) best response to δ A =Right in the rst game.
Discussion
Let us summarize our results: First, we are able to show that the impulse is triggered predominantly by bad news. That is, players who receive a payo below a certain reference value by choosing action k decrease the condence with which k is selected in the consecutive period. In the meantime, the condence for the alternative action which yields the reference value for sure increases in a weakly signicant way. While we cannot generalize our results independent observations (nob), the r-square, and a chi-square-test for the goodness-of-t are reported.
8 Notice that there is no evidence on positive nor negative feedback learning for 100 − x − y. This, however, may result from its special character (see footnote 4).
to the scenario of multiple repeated interactions (perhaps impulses based on good news require several stimuli), it seems that learning at least in short sequences of repeated play is facilitated by negative feedback rather than positive feedback. 
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The game
In this experiment, you will play the following game twice. To distinguish the games, we call the rst game the blue game and the second game the green game. In each of the two games, there are two roles that are player A and player B. At the beginning of the experiment, you will be randomly assigned a role. In both games, you will hold the same role. In each game, you are randomly and anonymously matched with one player of the other role. Player A will be matched with player B. Player B will be matched with player A. You never interact with the same player twice. That is, for each of the two games you are assigned a new partner. For each of the two games you only get feedback about the behavior of the other party after you have decided for both games. [After player B has decided in the blue game, she learns how player A behaved in a blue game. Player A receives feedback about the behavior of the other party only after she has decided for both
During the experiment, we speak of points. Your total income will be calculated rst in points. At the end of the experiment, all the points you earn in the experiment will be converted into Euros with the following exchange rate:
points = 1 Euro
At the end of the experiment, one game will be randomly drawn from the two. Only the payment of the drawn game is payo-relevant, i.e., only the points you earn in the selected game determine your earnings. In addition, you will receive 4 Euros for your participation regardless of your behavior.
You will receive the total amount from us in cash. On the next page, we explain the special rules of this experiment.
The game has two stages:
Stage 1: The player in the role of A chooses Up, Left, or Right. Stage 2: The player in the role B receives 100 points. Without knowing the choice of player A, player B must now decide how many points x out of the 100 points she puts in the rst account, and how many points y out of the 100 points she puts in the second account (x and y are both numbers between 0 and 100; the sum of x and y cannot exceed 100). B retains the rest, that is, 100 − x − y.
The payos of the players are calculated as follows:
If player A chooses Up, player A earns (100 − x − y) + qx + ry points and player B earns q(100 − x − y) + x + py points. If player A chooses Left, player A earns (100 − x − y) + qx + qy points and player B earns q(100 − x − y) + rx + y points.
If player A chooses Right, player A earns p(100 − x − y) + rx + y points and player B earns r(100 − x − y) + x + qy points.
In the actual games, you will see numbers instead of letters p, q, and r.
The numbers remain the same in the blue and green games, i.e., the blue and the green games are identical. You will play the game twice with dierent people, but you will always play the same role. Please choose rst for the blue game and then for the green game. The following gure shows the game again schematically: 
Your payment
At the end of the experiment, one game will be randomly chosen as your nal payo.
If you have any questions, please contact us now.
